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INTRODUCTION
This paper addresses recent developments in Australia in
intellectual property law, with some reference to the global
economy, and deals with two patent cases, two copyright
cases and a designs case.  
It is a given that intellectual property laws are closely tied
to the economy, these days a global economy.  Such laws are
intended to strike the correct balance between
encouraging innovation and investment on the one hand,
and, on the other, securing the interests of industry, indeed
society at large, in having access to the spread of
knowledge.  
The five cases I have chosen to discuss have two aspects
in common.  First, they have all been decided relatively
recently and represent the current state of the law in
Australia in respect of the points they decide.  Second, they
collectively demonstrate that although technological
advances pose undeniable challenges for intellectual
property laws, some basic concepts, laid down some time
ago, have often proved remarkably supple.  This is not to
deny a body of academic criticism of intellectual property
laws which alleges a lack of coherence or a lack of ability to
deal with novel technology, particularly in the context of
copyright law and the ease of copying with digital
technology.  Examples of this include David Vaver,
“Reforming Intellectual Property Law: An Obvious and
Not-so-Obvious Agenda: The Stephen Stewart Lecture for
2008”, (2009) Intellectual Property Quarterly 143; and
Kenneth Himma, “The Justification of Intellectual
Property: Contemporary Philosophical Disputes”,
Berkeley Center for Law and Technology (2006) Paper 21;
http://repositories.cdlib.org/bclt/Its/21.
Rather, it is my intention to provide recent examples of
Australian intellectual property laws operating on
particular sets of facts and to examine the questions to
which these cases give rise. 
Burge & Ors v Swarbrick
In the designs case, Burge & Ors v Swarbrick (2007) 232
CLR 336; [2007] HCA 17 a naval architect, Mr Swarbrick,
designed and through his private company manufactured, a
racing yacht, the JS 9000.  In the course of doing so a
“plug” was made, that is a handcrafted full scale model of
the hull and deck sections of what became the finished
yacht.  Hull and deck mouldings were reproduced from
moulds which were exact, but inverted, copies of the plug.  
In proceedings for copyright infringement, Mr Swarbrick
contended that the plug and the hull and deck mouldings,
were works of “artistic craftsmanship” within the definition
of artistic works in section 10 of the Copyright Act 1968
(Cth) (“the Copyright Act”).  He had not obtained any
protection for them as designs under the Designs Act 1906
(Cth) (“the Designs Act”).  
The case raised for the first time, in Australia, the
question of the proper test for determining whether a work
was a work of “artistic craftsmanship” because, in the
absence of design protection, under the Designs Act,
Mr Swarbrick was only able to rely on such copyright as he
had in the works as works of “artistic craftsmanship”.
Under section 77 of the Copyright Act, copyright
protection against three-dimensional reproduction of an
artistic work was denied where the “corresponding design”
(whether or not registrable under the Designs Act) had been
“applied industrially” by or with the licence of the copyright
owner. The alleged infringer, Boldgold Investments Pty Ltd
(“Boldgold”) defended its actions in attempting to reverse
engineer the racing yacht by claiming that the plug and the
hull and deck mouldings were “corresponding designs”
within the meaning of that phrase in section 74 of the
Copyright Act and as no designs had been registered by Mr
Swarbrick there was no copyright infringement because of
the statutory loss of protection under section 77.  
It was explained in a unanimous judgment that the
statutory phrase “artistic craftsmanship” was doubly
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significant for the case. First, it is a species of “artistic
work” capable of attracting copyright protection.  Second,
the phrase has been used recently to supply the discrimen
to mark off the perennially problematic overlap between
copyright and design protection.  The ultimate issue in the
case was whether the racing yacht, the JS 9000, embodied
“a work of artistic craftsmanship” in the statutory sense. 
The historical difficulties with overlap between
copyright and design protection, both in the United
Kingdom and Australia, are canvassed in the judgment.
The court particularly noted the description of the
Copyright, Designs and Patent Act 1988 (UK) (“the 1988
UK Act”) by Pumfrey J in Mackie Designs Inc v Behringer
Specialised Studio Equipment (UK) Ltd [1999] RPC 717 at
723:
“[i]t was clearly the intention of the framers of [the 1988
UK Act] that copyright protection was no longer to be
available to what can be compendiously described as ordinary
functional commercial articles”.  
That Act created a new system for protecting designs of
industrial products, partly through copyright law, but more
significantly, through dual systems governing both
registered and unregistered designs. 
To return to the Australian case, Burge v Swarbrick was
governed by the Copyright Amendment Act 1989 (Cth)
which was designed to overcome the similar
copyright/design overlap difficulties dealt with by the 1988
UK Act.  It resulted in changes to the Copyright Act.  As
mentioned, a new section 77 operated to deny copyright
protection against three-dimensional reproduction where
the “corresponding design” (whether registrable or not
under the Designs Act) had been “applied industrially”,
that is applied to more than 50 articles.  
A relevant exception to the operation of these loss of
protection provisions was provided in section 77(1)(a)
which provided that the loss of protection provisions
applied where copyright subsists in artistic work “other
than … a work of artistic craftsmanship”.  The effect of
that provision was that a work of “artistic craftsmanship”
retained copyright protection but only if not registered
under the Designs Act.
In construing the phrase “artistic craftsmanship” for the
purposes of the Australian legislation, the High Court had
regard to what Lord Simon of Glaisdale had said in George
Hensher Ltd v Restawile Upholstery (Lancs) Ltd [1976] AC 64.
This differed considerably from what was said by others
who heard the appeal.  That case concerned a popular suite
of furniture of distinctive design described as “boat
shaped” and marketed as the Bronx. The appellants sued
for infringement of copyright in respect of the prototype.
The copyright relied upon was that in respect of works of
“artistic craftsmanship” as provided in the 1956 UK Act.  
Lord Simon had recognised the composite nature of the
phrase “a work of artistic craftsmanship” and construed it
as a whole.  He also recognised that there was no relevant
distinction between the phrase “a work of artistic
craftsmanship” used in the Copyright Act 1956 (UK) and
that found in the Copyright Act 1911 (UK), where it had
originated.  He then referred to the Arts and Crafts
Movement and the activities of John Ruskin and William
Morris and said it was that movement with its emphasis on
“the applied or decorative arts” which prompted the
legislature in 1911 to give copyright protection to “works
of artistic craftsmanship.”  
As to a work of craftsmanship, Lord Simon said (at 91):
“‘Craftsmanship’, particularly when considered in its historical
context, implies a manifestation of pride in sound
workmanship – a rejection of the shoddy, the meretricious, the
facile.” 
He then said (at 93):
“Even more important, the whole antithesis between utility
and beauty, between function and art, is a false one –
especially in the context of the Arts and Crafts movement. ‘I
never begin to be satisfied’, said Philip Webb, one of the
founders, ‘until my work looks commonplace.’  Lethaby’s
object, declared towards the end, was ‘to create an efficiency of
style.’  Artistic form should they all held, be an emanation of
regard for materials on the one hand and for function on the
other.” 
Lord Simon then asked whether the work under
consideration was a work of “one who was … an artist-
craftsman”; in the course of answering that he
distinguished between various crafts particularly by
reference to functional constraints.  
Having approved that approach of Lord Simon, the High
Court in Burge v Swarbrick concluded that (at 364):
“It may be impossible, and certainly would be unwise, to
attempt any exhaustive and fully predictive identification of
what can and cannot amount to ‘a work of artistic
craftsmanship’ within the meaning of the Copyright Act as it
stood after the 1989 (Amendment) Act.  However, determining
whether a work is ‘a work of artistic craftsmanship’ does not
turn on assessing the beauty or aesthetic appeal of work or on
assessing any harmony between its visual appeal and its utility.
The determination turns on assessing the extent to which the
particular work’s artistic expression, in its form, is
unconstrained by functional considerations.” 
The appeal was ultimately decided on the basis that the
plug was not a work of artistic craftsmanship because the
work of Mr Swarbrick in designing it was not that of an
artist-craftsman. The evidence had demonstrated that
matters of visual and aesthetic appeal were subordinated to
the achievement of purely functional requirements.  As a
necessary corollary the hull and deck moulds were also not
works of artistic craftsmanship. 
Further amendment to the copyright legislation by the
Designs (Consequential Amendments) Act 2003 (Cth) 21
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intended to further deal with the copyright/designs overlap
did not include a recommendation that had been made by
the Australian Law Reform Commission that “artistic
craftsmanship” should be defined.  Accordingly the
primary issue decided in the appeal continues to be
relevant.  
The decision is important for its commercial
ramifications and could be of some interest in the United
Kingdom, despite a different regime for protecting
individual designs, because “original artistic works”, as
defined in section 4 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents
Act 1988 (UK), includes “a work of artistic
craftsmanship”.  It can be noted that in the United States,
the Vessel Hull Design Protection Act 1998, 17 USC §
1301, 1302 conferred sui generis protection upon designs
for vessel hulls including “plugs” and “moulds.”
Lockwood Security Products Pty Ltd v Doric
Products Pty Ltd [No 2] 
The second case is a patent case reported as Lockwood
Security Products Pty Ltd v Doric Products Pty Ltd [No 2] (2008)
235 CLR 173; [2007] HCA 21 (“Lockwood v Doric [No 2]”).
It raised a common dilemma in patent law: namely, the
standard of inventiveness sufficient to justify the monopoly
of a patent.  
Historically, the separate requirement of inventiveness
sprang from novelty from which, at first, it was not clearly
distinguished.  This can be traced easily through a series of
cases mostly in the second half of the 19th century (see
Crane v Price (1842) 1 Web Pat Cas 393 at 409 per Tindal
CJ; Tatham v Dania (1869) Griffin Pat Cas 213 at 214 per
Willes J; Britain v Hirsch (1888) 5 RPC 226 at 232 per
Cotton LJ; Cole v Saqui (1888) 6 RPC 41 at 44 per Lindley
LJ;  The Edison Bell Phonograph Corporation Limited v Smith
(1894) 11 RPC 389 at 398 per Lord Esher MR).
The requirement of “ingenuity” or “inventiveness” was
“a brake”on too ready a grant of patent protection for
analogous uses (Lewis Edmunds, The Law and Practice of
Letters Patent for Inventions, (2nd ed, 1897 at 84). The
requirement of an inventive step and the correlative, that a
patent not be granted for an improvement which was
obvious, were control mechanisms intended to inhibit the
grant of weak or worthless patents which would inhibit the
development of improvements well within the skill of the
noninventive persons in the relevant art.  
Lockwood v Doric [No 2] concerned a lock mechanism.
Lockwood’s new lock was designed so that when the lock
was opened from the outside the inside lock disengaged
thus overcoming the problem whereby a person on the
inside could become trapped because without a key they
could not unlock a deadlocked door from the inside.  The
main question was whether the new lock involved an
inventive step over the prior art or whether it was a step
which would have been obvious to a person skilled in the
relevant art. 
As with an earlier case, Aktiebolaget Hässle v Alphapharm Pty
Ltd (2002) 212 CLR 411; [2002] HCA 59 (“Alphapharm”),
the court had regard to historical considerations
concerning the development of the inventive step
requirement and the law concerning obviousness. The
High Court in Lockwood v Doric [No 2] restated the position
that the requirement of an inventive step balances
competing policy considerations as follows (at 194):
“The emergence of the independent requirement for an
inventive step, first in case law, then in legislative
requirements for patentability as occurred in the United
Kingdom, the United States and Australia, has always
reflected the balance of policy considerations in patent law of
encouraging and rewarding inventors without impeding
advances and improvements by skilled, non-inventive
persons.”
It had been noted in Alphapharm that the term “obvious”
first appeared in legislation in the United Kingdom, United
States and Australia after detailed judicial exegesis (at 428-
429 [36] per Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne
JJ). Now, the legislatures both here in the United Kingdom
and in Australia have laid down a conceptual framework for
determining inventiveness and obviousness which in each
case is intended to ensure that patents will not be granted
without inventiveness over prior art. 
The threshold for inventiveness had been raised in the
United Kingdom with the introduction of section 3 in the
Patents Act 1977 (UK).  Membership of the Patent Union
had necessitated aligning domestic patent law with the
European Patent Convention which involved rebalancing
the competing policy considerations adverted to in
Lockwood v Doric [No 2]. Before turning to section 3, it
needs to be noted that s 2(2) of the Patents Act 1977
(UK) defined the “state of the art” as follows:
“[I]t shall be taken to comprise all matter (whether a
product, a process, information about either, or anything else)
which has at any time before the priority date of that
invention been made available to the public (whether in the
United Kingdom or elsewhere) by written or oral description,
by use or in any other way.”  
Section 3 of the Patents Act 1977 (UK) was explicated
by Sir Donald Nicholls VC in Mölnlycke AB v Proctor &
Gamble Ltd [No 5] [1994] RPC 49 at 112:
“Under the statutory code … the criterion for deciding
whether or not the claimed invention involves an inventive step
is wholly objective.  It is an objective criterion defined in
statutory terms, that is to say whether the step was obvious to
a person skilled in the art having regard to any matter which
forms part of the state of the art as defined in section 2(2).
We do not consider that it assists to ask whether ‘the patent
discloses something sufficiently inventive to deserve the grant of
a monopoly[‘].  Nor is it useful to extract from older
judgments expressions such as ‘that scintilla of invention
necessary to support a patent’.” 22
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This was a clear rebuff to the notion that it is
appropriate to concentrate on the quantum of
inventiveness; what is put in the forefront, in the place
of quantum is the need to establish the quality of
inventiveness. 
The prior art base has also been extended in Australia.
The Patents Act 1990 (Cth) first defined “prior art base”
and “prior art information” and the Patents Amendment
Act 2001 (Cth) expanded the prior art base, against which
“inventive step” is assessed so as to include public oral
disclosures and actions anywhere in the world.
In Lockwood v Doric [No 2] the court recognised that
“the problem and solution” approach mandated here
in the United Kingdom is useful, however the approach
is to be applied with care in Australia so as not to
exclude inventions containing a sufficient quantum of
inventiveness.  
The court found a “scintilla of invention” remains
enough in Australia so that Australian law blends
considerations of both the quantum and the quality of
inventiveness and is therefore quite distinct from the law
generated by the European Patent Convention which refers
to a “problem and solution” approach to the question of
inventive step.  In any event it has been recognised that the
“problem and solution” approach has its limitations and is
not the only way to go about considering obviousness
(Actairs UK Limited v Novartis AG [2010] EWCA Civ 82 at
[26] and [39] per Jacob LJ).  
It is of interest to note that in KSR v Teleflex 127 Sct
1727, 1741-43 (2007) the Supreme Court of the United
States of America suggested that courts and patent
examiners should go further than considering the
“problem and solution approach.”  
The question of what is the correct threshold for
inventiveness can be expected to remain under scrutiny
particularly with applications for global patent protection
in respect of novel subject matter such as gene patenting.
Because genes and genetic products are emerging as both
diagnostic and treatment tools for cancer, it may be
contended in the future that the balance needs to be
restruck between the need for the protection and
encouragement of biotechnology innovations and the
competing need for the public to have ready access to the
benefits of genetic testing and technology.
Certainly, as Professor Cornish observes, the decision of
the United States Supreme Court in Diamond v Chakrabart
65 Law Ed. (2d) 144 (1980), which upheld patent
protection for a genetically engineered organism which
could disperse oil spills, “sent a crucial signal to the world
that patenting must be made available in any country which
sought to join the race for commercial returns on
biotechnological research” (Cornish and Llewellyn,
Intellectual Property: Patents, Copyright, Trade Marks & Allied
Rights, 6th ed (2007) at 221, [5-65]).  
A not unrelated question is whether the exclusion of
methods of medical treatment from patentability under
European law should remain (see Directive 98/44/EC on
the Legal Protection of Biotechnological Inventions,
[1998] O.J. L213/13).  Any redrawing of the boundaries of
the patent system is inevitably a restriking of the balance
which I have mentioned. 
Yet another contemporary American context in which
an argument has been raised for heightening the threshold
of inventiveness (or non-obviousness) is the context of
patents for interfaces which may impede interoperability
among information and communication technologies:
Pamela Samuelson, “Are Patents on Interfaces Impeding
Interoperability?”, (2009) 93 Minnesota Law Review 1943 at
1979.  That proposal seems referable at least in part to a
recognition that patents for interface designs may be
sought for anticompetitive purposes, that is as a tool for
blocking competitors from developing compatible
products and for controlling the market for
complementary products. 
Finally, there has been continuing public discussion in IP
Australia’s consultation paper entitled Getting the Balance
right: Toward a Stronger and More Efficient IP Rights System
(November 2009) about whether the threshold for
inventiveness should be raised so as to be more closely
aligned with patentability standards in regions which are
Australia’s major trading partners. 
Northern Territory of Australia v Collins and Anor
The third case is the second of the patent cases, Northern
Territory of Australia v Collins and Anor (2008) 235 CLR 619;
[2008] HCA 49.  This concerned a quite narrow question
of contributory infringement.  
Mr and Mrs Collins, a married couple, were the joint
registered proprietors of an Australian patent for methods
of producing essential oils from Cypress pine timber. Such
oils were produced for use in aromatherapy. The Northern
Territory granted four licences to a company to enter
various plantations to take and harvest Cypress pine
timber.  Mr and Mrs Collins sued the Northern Territory
alleging contributory infringement under section 117 of
the Patents Act 1990 (Cth) (“Patents Act”).  Section 117
relevantly provided:
“(1) If the use of a product by a person would infringe a
patent, the supply of that product by one person to
another is an infringement of the patent by the
supplier unless the supplier is the patentee or
licensee of the patent.
(2) A reference in subsection (1) to the use of a product
by a person is a reference to:
(a) …
(b) if the product is not a staple commercial product
– any use of the product, if the supplier had 23
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reason to believe that the person would put it to
that use; or 
(c) …”
It can be seen that subsection (2)(b) provided what was
in effect an exception to the concept of use where the
product supplied was a “staple commercial product”.  The
Northern Territory submitted that the timber in question
was a staple commercial product within the meaning of
section 117(2)(b) of the Act. Section 117 does not refer to
the exclusive rights given to exploit the invention for the
term of the patent (Patents Act s 13). Section 117
identifies conduct namely the “supply of [a] product” by
one to another.  Liability for infringement is imposed when
“the use of [the] product” by the person to whom it is
supplied “would infringe [the] patent”.  
In considering whether the timber taken under the
statutory licences was a “staple commercial product”, a
reference was made, in the joint judgment of Gummow
ACJ and Kirby J, to cognate expressions in both the United
Kingdom and the United States (Northern Territory v Collins
at 625-26 [24-27]).  The evidence in the case showed that
the timber under consideration was suitable for use in a
variety of applications. The conclusion that the timber in
question was a “staple commercial product” was
determinative of the appeal. Accordingly, whilst there had
been a relevant supply of timber, the supply was not
capable of constituting contributory infringement.
Whilst this case was resolved on a narrow basis, the
idea of contributory or indirect infringement in patent
law influenced the United States Supreme Court in the
Sony case (Sony Corporation of America v Universal City
Studios (1984) 464 US 417) which involved an
infringement-enabling device and the question of
whether copyright infringement was made out in
circumstances where the device could be used for
“substantial non-infringing uses.”
The whole area of the liability of businesses for the
infringements of their customers is likely to continue to be
interesting as the United States Supreme Court further
considers secondary liability for copyright infringement.
For a discussion of these issues and the cases see Jane C
Ginsburg, “Separating the Sony Sheep from the Grokster
Goats: Reckoning the Future Business Plans of Copyright –
Dependent Technology Entrepreneurs”, Columbia Law
School, Columbia Public Law Research (2008), paper 08–166.
Copyright Agency Limited v New South Wales
The last two cases for consideration are copyright cases.
Copyright Agency Ltd v State of New South Wales (2008) 233
CLR 279; [2008] HCA 35 concerned government copying
of material being survey plans compulsorily lodged with
relevant authorities.  The final case, IceTV v Nine Network
Aust P/L (2009) 83 ALJR 585; [2009] HCA 14, concerns
copyright in respect of compilations.
Copyright Agency Ltd v State of New South Wales involved a
statutory licence scheme under the Copyright Act 1968
(Cth) (“Copyright Act”). As noted in the judgment (at
296-267 [48]):
“[t]he emergence and refinement of statutory licence schemes
has been a distinct part of the modern development of
copyright law reflecting the competing economic interests of
copyright owners and others with a legitimate interest in
‘being able to use copyright material on reasonable terms’.
The quest to maintain the balance between a public policy
encouraging creativity and a public policy of permitting
certain uses on some reasonable basis, continues to preoccupy
the legislature, particularly as modern techniques for copying,
especially digital electronics are ‘both immensely efficient and
easy to use’.”  (footnotes omitted)
The appellant, Copyright Agency Ltd, was a recognised
collecting society. Collecting societies have become
increasingly relevant beyond their original function in
respect of musical performance rights.  This is because of
photocopying technology and more recently new digital
technology for the easy distribution of information. One of
the members of Copyright Agency Ltd was the Australian
Consulting Surveyors Association.  Members of the
Surveyors Association produced survey plans of land and
strata in the state of New South Wales; they owned the
copyright in survey plans produced by them.  
The survey plans were “artistic works” protected by s
10(1) of the Act.  The copyright in the artistic works, the
survey plans, included the exclusive right to reproduce the
survey plans in a material form (s 31(1)(b)(i)) and to
communicate them to the public (s 31(1)(b)(iii)).  
Two international treaties signed in Geneva in
December 1996, the WIPO Copyright Treaty and the
WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, expanded
the right of communication to the public, making it an
independent and exclusive right consonant with the
technology of the Internet. The Copyright Amendment
(Digital Agenda) Act 2000 introduced the novel and
exclusive right of communication to the public and section
10 of the Copyright Act defines “communicate” as “to
make available online or electronically transmit (whether
over a path, or a combination of paths, provided by a
material substance or otherwise) a work or other subject-
matter”.  Section 36(1) of the Copyright Act provided that
the copyright in an artistic work was infringed by a person
who, not being the owner of the copyright, and without the
licence of the owner of the copyright, did or authorised the
doing in Australia of any act comprised in the copyright.  
The survey plans in question were necessary to enable
the State to create and maintain an accurate record of land
and interests in land.  There were legal requirements for
the preparation and lodgement of such survey plans. Only
registered surveyors could prepare such plans which they
did by following certain legal requirements. Typically
surveyors charged their clients for the production of survey24
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plans. The Registrar-General, Land and Property
Management Authority, with whom the plans were lodged
was obliged by law to provide copies of registered plans to
members of the public upon request.  The Copyright
Agency Ltd applied to the Copyright Tribunal for a
determination of the terms upon which the State could
make digital copies of the survey plans and communicate
them to the public.  In doing so it relied on section 183
which provided a licensing scheme for government use.
The scheme of section 183 is to provide that the doing of
an act comprised in the copyright in an artistic work does
not constitute an infringement of copyright in the work “if
the acts done are done for the services of ” the State. 
The Copyright Agency Ltd argued that section 183 is a
statutory licence scheme leaving no room for the
implication of a licence to copy the plans or communicate
them to the public.  It was contended that there was no
need to imply a licence when an express statutory licence
was available. 
The State submitted that in all the circumstances it was
not dependent on section 183 to except it from
infringement, because it has an implied licence, binding on
the owners of the copyright in the plans, to do everything
it was required to do within the statutory and regulatory
framework which governs the plans.  Implicitly the State
contended that by reason of the implied licence it had free
use of such plans.
The court accepted the appellant’s argument.  The court
recognised that the Act had several licence schemes which
developed in tandem with improved techniques for
copying of copyright works. It also noted that two related
developments in the middle of the 20th century
constituted the setting in which a special committee was
appointed to reconsider inevitable tensions between the
rights of copyright owners and the public need for
reasonable access to copyright works. 
First, Article 7 of the 1948 Brussels Revision of the Berne
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works 1886,
had provided that the terms of copyright protection shall be
for the life of the author plus 50 years after the date of the
author’s death.  This raised the prospect that the system of
compulsory licensing then in place would prevent copying
long after the economic interest in doing so had dissipated.
Second, Crown immunity for copyright infringement was
abolished in the United Kingdom which raised the question
of Australia following suit and instituting a system whereby
the Crown might use copyright material without the risk of
infringement.  Section 183 had been introduced by the
Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) to ensure that the
Commonwealth and the States had a right to use copyright
material in circumstances where such use was without the
owner’s consent. 
The result reaffirmed the efficacy of the particular
statutory licensing system with which it was concerned.  It
can be expected that statutory licensing schemes will be
subject to continual updating as new technologies emerge
which simplify copying.  A related issue which I simply
mention is the burgeoning of “fair use” exceptions to
copyright infringement which may call for some future
rationalisation. 
IceTV Pty Ltd v Nine Network
The final case, IceTV Pty Ltd v Nine Network concerned a
compilation of factual material.  Nine Network (“Nine”)
sued IceTV Pty Ltd (“IceTV”) for alleged infringement of
copyright in Nine’s television programme schedules.
These were literary works under section 10 of the
Copyright Act as “literary work” includes “a table or
compilation, expressed in words, figures or symbols”.  The
case gave rise to the question of whether copyright
protection was confined to a particular mode of expression
and whether it could be extended to facts or information.
Australian legislation has no counterpart to the 1996
Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council
on the Legal Protection of Databases.
The appellant, IceTV, published an online television
programme guide for use with digital recording devices.
The electronic guide was compiled from various sources
including the weekly programme schedules compiled and
released to the public by television networks. The
respondent network claimed that IceTV had infringed
copyright in its weekly schedules by directly reproducing
details of the titles of its programmes and the times at
which they would be broadcast.  That information referred
to as “time and title” information was claimed by the
network to be a substantial part of its weekly schedules of
programmes.  This gave rise to the submission that IceTV
had appropriated the skill and labour of the network’s
employees in the process of selecting programmes to be
screened and placing them in particular timeslots so as to
optimise advertising revenue.
One of the interesting issues to which the case gave rise
was whether mere “sweat of the brow” in preparing a
compilation was sufficient to establish the subsistence of
copyright.  In Feist Publications Inc. v Rural Telephone Service Co
Inc 499 US 340 (1991) the United States Supreme Court
rejected the argument that “sweat of the brow” in compiling
information was enough and found that some creative spark
was necessary to establish copyright in a compilation. 
The judgments confirmed the proposition that
copyright does not protect facts or information; what
copyright protects is the particular form of expression in
which facts and information are to be found.  It was further
held that assessing the substantiality of the part copied
should not be carried out at too high a level of abstraction
because that created a risk that “ideas” of an author would
be protected rather than the expression in a material form
of the ideas.
Another interesting aspect of the judgments is the
confirmation that originality of the compilation was to be 25
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determined by reference to the whole of the work. The
expression of the “time and title” information was
essentially dictated by the nature of that information
therefore it lacked originality associated with mental effort
or exertion.  
Furthermore, all the judges recognised that in assessing
whether reproduction of a substantial part of an original
work involves an appropriation of skill and labour of the
author (or authors) it is necessary to examine the skill and
labour and to ask whether it is in fact directed to the
originality of the form of expression.  In one of the joint
judgments, the various stages in the production of the
weekly schedules was considered and the three judges in
that joint judgment found that the preponderance of steps
taken in relation to the production of the weekly schedules
were steps directed to Nine’s [ie the television network’s]
business, and that the steps directed to producing the
weekly schedule and revising it and making last minute
changes involved only modest skill and labour.  
Because the expression of the time and title information
was essentially dictated by the nature of the information,
and involved no particular, or extremely modest, exertion,
IceTV’s taking and use of the time and title information
was found not to amount qualitatively to a reproduction of
a substantial part. 
One commentator on the decision has pointed out that
this decision aligns the Australian law in relation to factual
compilations with its major trading partners: Glenn
McGowan SC, “IceTV v Nine Network and the copyright in
factual compilations in Australia”, (2009) 83 ALJ 840 (at
848):
“• United States – Feist Publications, Inc. v Rural Telephone Co
499 US 340 (1991) where copyright subsistence was
denied in telephone books because no creativity and
mere sweat-of-the-brow;
• Canada – CCH Canadian Ltd v Law Society of Upper Canada
[2004] 1 SCR 339; 2004 SCC 13, roughly applied Feist,
finding the exercise of skill and judgment must not be
so trivial that it could be characterised as a purely
mechanical exercise;
• England and Europe – EU Database Directive 1996,
96/9/EC, March 11, 1996; British Horseracing Board v
William Hill [2005] EWCA (Civ) 863 where BHB failed
to protect its racing data.” 
This case is also significant in its rejection of use of
copyright for essentially anti-competitive purposes.  
The five cases discussed all involved intellectual property
issues which transcend national boundaries and some
touch upon issues which form part of the ongoing debates
in the United Kingdom, the United States of America and
Australia, about the scope of patent and copyright law.  If
one takes copyright as a representative example, the Berne
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic
Works 1886 and the revisions thereto, the TRIPS
Agreement of 1994 and, as mentioned above, the treaties
of 1996 (which build on the Berne Convention),
collectively demonstrate the global possibility of relatively
uniform standards of national protection, including new
provisions creating new exclusive rights in the current
world of internet communications. 
That still leaves for consideration the argument advanced
by Simon Stokes in Digital Copyright Law and Practice, 3rd ed
(2009) at 3 that:
“the effect of strengthening copyright law in recent years to
address the digital agenda will be to seriously and
unjustifiably restrict the dissemination of speech, information,
learning and culture while not providing any decisive
incentives to the creator.” (footnotes omitted)
In the United Kingdom, the Treasury published the
Gowers Review of Intellectual Property on December 6, 2006.
More recently on December 16, 2008, the Intellectual
Property office published Developing a Copyright Agenda for
the 21st Century. Likewise, in Australia various government-
run consultations have just been completed or are still in
progress in relation to numerous aspects of intellectual
property, particularly in relation to the challenges to
copyright law posed by new technologies.
In the contemporary global economy, intellectual
property also has to be assessed by reference to anti-
competitive conduct and the general embrace of
competitive market principles in many parts of the world.
Whilst public debate about the scope and duration of
patent, designs, trade marks and copyright protection will
surely continue, individual cases such as those discussed
above, show the continual restriking, by the courts, of the
balance between a perceived need to reward innovation,
investment and original work and the need to ensure fair
public access to knowledge, information and culture. 
In Making History Now and Then (2008), an
historiographical study concerning Britain’s Industrial
Revolution, David Cannadine makes the point (at pp 83-
111) that the first half of the 1970s saw a turning point in
the world economy and the West, such that a steady
pattern of post World War II economic progress halted.
He observes that “by the 1980s it was clear that Britain was
in the midst, not just of a new and severe cyclical
depression reminiscent of the inter-war years, but of a
transformative and scarring process of ‘de-industrializing’
that was occurring more rapidly that elsewhere in the
Western World.” One can add to that description of “de-
industrializing”, the contemporary experience of a global
financial crisis and current scepticism about the efficacy of
many of the 20th century policies intended to assist
developing countries. 
Individual intellectual property cases frequently require
an understanding of the history and progress of the
relevant legislation.  What that undoubtedly shows is that26
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Anglo-American intellectual property law developed
significantly in the late 19th century as a reflection of the
industrial and social progress conventionally associated
with the Industrial Revolution: see Adam Mossoff, “The
Use and Abuse of IP at the Birth of the Administrative
State”, (2009) 157 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 2001
at 2022, and also Susan Crennan, “Obviousness –
Different Paths Through Scylla and Charybdis”, (2007)
(71) Intellectual Property Forum 12.  Australian intellectual
property law followed suit as the second half of the 19th
century was a period of great development in Australia,
especially in the boom years of the 1870s and 1880s (see
Andrew Kenyon, Megan Richardson and Sam Ricketson
(eds), Landmarks in Australian Intellectual Property, (2009) at
xviii).
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, may I venture the view that, whatever the
economic or technological imperatives for change to
intellectual property laws in the 21st century, certain ideas
which blossomed in the last third of the 19th century and
in the early 20th century are likely to remain constants.
They are that there is great social utility in rewarding
inventors and designers with limited monopolies and also
in protecting, for a period, the original works specified
under copyright legislation. International patent
applications now reflect the great interest of China, now
the world’s sixth largest producer of patent applications,
and Japan in becoming major producers of intellectual
property. Significant investment in research and
development leads to economies which favour the
protection given by intellectual property laws.  
We are more likely to see relevant intellectual property
laws adapting to assimilate new technologies and what they
make possible, such as file saving, and remaining relevant
to them rather than to see a diminution in the scope of
intellectual property laws or in the duration of the
protection which such laws give.  This may involve greater
emphasis on secondary infringement rather than upon
infringement by consumers of works available through
digital media. 
This of course must remain subject always to the general
proposition that laws must be fair and capable of
obedience.  Intellectual property laws, like other rules or
laws, must command a social consensus if they are to be
enforceable.  This is one, but not the only, reason why the
policy questions presently debated in the field of
intellectual property, particularly patents and copyright, are
likely to remain both complex and vigorous.
• The paper is taken from a lecture given at the Institute
of Advanced Legal Studies on February 15, 2010.
Susan Crennan
Justice of the High Court of Australia
